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In this study I provide an assessment of the factors that make Venture Capital (VC) a 
form of financial intermediation able to contribute to fostering innovation and economic 
growth, with particular reference to Asia and the Pacific.  
 
In Section II, I briefly review the literature on VC as a specialized financial 
intermediary. I will show the constraints under which VC firm operate; in particular, the 
need to satisfy the requirements set by institutional investors (Limited Partners, LPs), 
which are the ultimate source of funding for innovative companies. I also describe how 
VC investors operate, pointing to several distinctive traits that set them apart from other 
investors, like banks, corporations, the crowd, and wealthy individuals. Based on this 
knowledge about venture investors I consider evidence on their contribution to 
innovation and economic growth, both at industry and at firm level.  
 
In Section III, I focus on which factors have been shown to favor and support the growth 
of an effective venture industry. Section IV I bring the analysis to policy level, and I 
examine evidence on how active policy can, or cannot, support an effective venture 
industry. Finally, Section V looks more specifically at issues and opportunities relevant 
for the Asia and Pacific regions.  
 
 
II. How Does Venture Capital Contribute to Innovation and 
Economic Growth? 
 
A. What is venture capital? A primer 
 
Venture capital is a specialized form of financial intermediation that provides funding to 
innovative new ventures with high-growth prospects (Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri, 2013). 
Therefore, VC firms largely invest funds provided by other institutions or by wealthy 
individuals. Institutional investors (banks, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, 
family offices, etc.) invest in VC as part of their allocation to ‘alternative assets.’ This is 
very important, because intermediation creates constraints and incentives that are quite 
different from those that one would observe for investors that contribute their own 
money. 
  
A major problem that intermediated venture finance needs to solve is a classic principal-
agent problem, where an agent who acts on behalf of a principal can exploit his superior 
knowledge to take advantage of the principal (Sahlman (1990)). In the context of VC 
investing, institutional investors (the principals) contribute money to VC firms (the 
agents) which can behave opportunistically in many ways (see Phalippou (2009)). For 
example, they can invest in companies that are outside the intended strategy (say in data 
science instead of nanotechnology), or in companies whose prospects are not very good 
but that the VC wants to bolster to show good performance before raising funds from 
other investors.  
 
As a solution, to these problems, at least partial, VC firms raise money through closed-
end fund vehicles that typically last ten years. The finite duration of these vehicles forces 
VC firms to disclose the true value of their investments, which need to be realized by the 
fund’s end date. At that point, institutional investors will be able to know the ‘true’ 
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return to their investment, and can make an informed decision whether to participate in 
the VC’s future funds or not.  
 
This structure, based on sequential fund-raising through closed-end fund vehicles that 
allow revelation of information about true investment returns, is central to the VC 
industry. For anybody looking from the outside, like a policy-maker or an entrepreneur, 
it is important to be aware of it because of several implications. 
 
First, institutional investors allocate money to VC firms on a comparative basis. 
Typically, an institutional investor will first decide an allocation of its portfolio to 
alternative assets, then to private equity, and within this to venture capital. Once the 
allocation to VC is decided, the investor will select in which VC firms to invest over 
several months. This puts much pressure on VC firms to deliver good returns on each of 
their funds, especially after the collapse of the dot.com bubble has made investors less 
keen to invest in this asset class.  
 
Second, the ten year span of fund vehicles implies that VC firms have a well-defined 
time-frame for investment. The first few years are called the ‘investment period,’ when 
the VC firm attracts, selects, and contracts with portfolio companies. The later years are 
called the ‘harvest period’, when the VC prepare the company for sale, most often 
through IPO or acquisition. For entrepreneurs this has to important consequences: (i) 
they can access funding only when a fund vehicle has been recently raised, so some VC 
firms may not always be accessible, and (ii) they are under pressure to deliver growth 
within about 5 years from funding. Such pressure naturally translates to portfolio 
companies. This is what makes VC such a powerful form of financial intermediation, but 
also an extremely demoing one for companies: there is little mercy for non-performers. 
 
Third, the closed-end nature of the fund vehicle bring additional implications for 
entrepreneurs. Companies which receive venture funding will need to be able to reach 
strong growth very soon, in order to become palatable to the market. Otherwise they risk 
being closed down, or sold at a low price when the time of wrapping up the fund vehicle 
comes. Also, companies in the portfolio of a VC are sometimes competing for scarce 
funding and scarce attention by the VC partners. This may lead to short-termism by of 
their funders, who may sacrifice long-term growth in order to deliver tangible short-term 
results.  
 
VC is therefore a powerful source of entrepreneurial finance. In particular, the 
specialized nature of intermediation that VC provides allows institutional investors to 
open their investment strategies to the very risky investments into entrepreneurial 
companies. In other words, VC allows mobilizing savings for funding innovative 
ventures. It is therefore an extremely valuable component of financial markets. As we 
will see in section III.D, VC is also quite distinct from other non-intermediated sources 
of entrepreneurial finance, and therefore enriches the set of possible funding sources for 
innovative entrepreneurs.  
 
At the same time, VC is also limited to funding a specific type of firms, those which can 
mature quickly and grow substantially within a very few years.  This is a very important 
characteristics, which is often not appreciated enough by policy-makers: VC funding is 
only for very few companies, those which can grow very fast and attain a considerably 










B. Captive venture capital firms 
 
While VC firms are mostly financial intermediaries, there are also some investors that 
are owned by an organization, and are therefore called ‘captives.’ Parent organization are 
most often industrial companies (like Siemens Venture Capital) or financial firms (like 
Citigroup), but also government agencies (like FinPiemonte, the financial investor of the 
Piedmont region in Italy). We can include also public development agencies among 
captive investors, since they are also financed by a captive owner that shields them from 
market pressure. To contrast them from captives, it is common to identify the VC firms 
that act as intermediaries as ‘independent’ VCs. 
 
The defining trait of captive venture investors is that they do not have a purely financial 
objective. While independent VCs need to generate large enough returns to be able to 
raising new funds from the market, captive VCs are funded by their parent organization. 
Their parents also give them investment mandates, which are often a mixture of financial 
and strategic goals (Hellmann (2002), Masulis and Nahata (2009)). For corporate VCs 
(or CVCs), a key priority is to gain access to new technology developed by nimble and 
innovative ventures (Da Gbadji, Gailly. and Schwienbacher (2015), Dushintsky and 
Lenox (2005)). Investment can also be used to gain toe-holds that allow getting 
acquainted with a new company and decide its future acquisition (Benson and Ziedonis 
(2010)), or to attract talented individuals (De Bettignies and Chemla (2008)). Indeed, 
CVCs often invest in younger and less mature—and therefore riskier—companies than 
VCs (Maula and Murray (2001), Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2014)). For 
entrepreneurs these patterns mean that a corporate investor can be a very attractive 
investor when the new venture is complementary to it, for example because it develops 
products that create demand for the established incumbent. An example could be 
software firms that develop application for an operating system. Such companies can 
find in CVCs initially a financier, and later on an acquirer.  
 
Financial firms often own growth-equity investors, which constitute a second important 
type of captive investors. The evidence shows that bank-owned investors tend to invest 
in companies that are less risky than the typical start-up (Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh 
(2005)), and that will later become clients of the investor’s parent organization 
(Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri (2008)).  
 
The third important category of captive investors has a public nature, and comprises a 
variety of agencies and financial companies that are used to foster technology and 
employment at regional or national level (see Duruflé (2010) for an overview). These 
investors are quite heterogeneous and they tend to invest in early stage companies or 
companies that have difficulty finding financial support in the market (see an assessment 
of the Australian experience in Cowling, Murray, and Liu (2010)). An interesting fact is 
that companies that receive public VC funds alongside with private VC funding tend to 
raise more money, produce more patents, and have more successful outcomes than 
companies that raise only public or only private funding (Brander, Du, and Hellmann 
(2010)). This suggests that public and private funding are complements and that 
entrepreneurs whose business idea allows them to raise both types of funding can obtain 
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more financial resources and more support from the very professional independent VCs. 
 
To conclude this section, it is important to notice that in venture markets which are less 
developed, like Asia and Europe, compared to the US, independent VCs are (relatively) 
fewer and less important as source of funding for new ventures, especially those at an 
early stage of development.  
 




In this sub-section, I am going to describe in some detail how VC firms operate, in order 
to better understand their contribution to innovation and growth. First, I look at 
independent VC firms. These are typically small partnership of less than a dozen 
individuals (Hsu and Kenney (2005)). VC partners are most often former entrepreneurs 
or industry executives with several years of experience in running and creating 
companies (Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015)). Several studies document the important 
role of human capital for venture investing (Dimov and Shepherd (2005), Zarutskie 
(2010)). The business experience of VC partners has been shown to lead to more support 
for portfolio companies and to better exit outcomes (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann 
(2008)).  
 
Captive VC exhibit more variety of organizational forms, but these are rarely 
partnerships. Corporate VCs are often structured as divisions or subsidiaries, and 
similarly bank-owned VCs. Public development agencies can take many different 
structures, often determined by national legal requirements. While independent VC firms 
need to build and maintain a reputation to be able to repeatedly return to the market to 
raise funding, captive VCs are not subject to such discipline. In a way this makes them 
more resilient and nimble, since their very existence and operations depend on the 
decision of their parent organization, As long as the parents has funds to commit to new 
investments and is satisfied with the performance of its venture arm, investments will 
continue. However, for the same reason, captive VC firms may also be quickly folded up 
if they no longer correspond to the goals of their parent’s management. Or they can be 
left with fewer resources, making it difficult to support, financially and managerially, 
their portfolio companies. This is clearly poses a threat to entrepreneurs, especially when 
their venture requires reliable support over long periods of time.  
 
Another important difference between independent and captive VCs concerns the way 
that professionals are remunerated. Talent requires compensation, and this is the case 
also in venture capital. Independent VC partnership rely on strong incentives to attract 
and retain talented partners. Partners share the profits of the firm, which are typically 
about 20% of the capital gain on exited companies. Compensation is very different at 
captive firms, where professionals are employees whose compensation is largely a fixed 
salary. These poses a challenge to captive VCs, because they find it difficult to hire top 
talent without the lure of a share of the firm’s profits. As Dushnitsky and Shapira (2010) 
document, few corporate VCs adopt high-powered compensation practices in the UK, 











Beyond organization, an important dimension that determines VC firms’ operations is 
their investment strategy. Here the difference between independents and captives is less 
relevant, as both types of VCs have (some) freedom in how they manage their portfolios. 
Given that experience is the core competency of VC partners, it is not surprising that VC 
investors often specialize in sectors and regions where partners have their knowledge, 
network of contacts, and ability to assess business plans, and that those which do are 
often more successful (Gompers, Kovner, and Lerner (2009)).  
 
VC investors face three main challenges in their investment activity: generating and 
negotiating a steady flow of good deals, supporting the portfolio companies in their 
quest for growth, and exiting the investments successfully. As we are going to see, all 
these activities are time-consuming and require specialized knowledge and considerable 
talent. By reviewing their nature, one can easily realize that VC investing is a demanding 
activity which naturally comes at a high cost, and that is difficult to replicate in a short 
period. In other words, knowing the VC business models teaches us how difficult it is to 
replicate it in different context without a large investment of time.  
 
Generating good deals in particularly difficult, because it entails reaching out to 
entrepreneurs who have either still to deliver a successful business plan, and are 
therefore not clearly visible to investors, or who have already started doing so and are 
therefore appealing to many other investors. Being visible and recognized as supportive 
investor is therefore very important, and VC firms spend time and resources reaching out 
to the entrepreneurial community. It is also interesting to notice that the majority of 
entrepreneurs, contrary to some stereotypes, come from established, often listed, 
companies (Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005)). Therefore VC firms are also very 
active in the corporate space, participating to industry fairs as speakers and active 
participants. While there is a small but apparently growing number of serial 
entrepreneurs, they rarely return to their initial funders when they start new ventures, 
either because they have accumulated enough financial wealth, or because they move 
into new markets which require different expertise than that of their erstwhile funders 
(Bengtsson (2013)).  
 
Another important way to access good deals is to cooperate with other VC investors. 
Syndication is very common, and it has been shown to be beneficial to the performance 
of companies funded by several VC investors (Chemmanur and Tian (2010)). One 
reason for this is that syndication allows investors to share information which is 
particularly valuable in the case of early stage, risky companies (Lerner (1994)). Another 
advantage of syndication is that it allows VC firms to extend their network and reach out 
to deals that they would otherwise not be able to invest in. Syndication indeed results 
into the creation of networks of investors that ensure their members a stable flow of 
good deals (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007, 2010). 
 
There is naturally competition among entrepreneurial ventures for funding and among 
VC firms for promising ventures. We know that VC firms choose on the basis of 
tangible characteristics like achievements ((Eckhardt, Shane, and Delmar (2006)), but 
also based on intangible characteristics like founders’ ability and sectoral appeal. In fact, 
it has been shown that more reputable VC firms tend to match with more promising 
entrepreneurs (Sørensen (2007)), so that part of the success of the VC model is due to its 
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ability to attract future winners, and not only to VC partners’ ability to ‘nurture’ great 
companies.  
 
The second major challenge for VC investors is supporting their portfolio companies. 
Being active investors is in fact a defining trait of VC firms (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and 
Hellmann (2008)). Supporting is achieved in two main ways. First, VCs offer financial 
contracts which are complex and aim at motivating the entrepreneur to work hard and 
bring the company towards highly ambitious goals; contracting also provides VC firms 
with protection of their funds in case of disappointing performance (Bengtsson and 
Sensoy (2011), Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2009), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)). 
There eare several important characteristics of venture financing contracts. One is the 
use of ‘convertible’ securities that allow investors debt-like protection in case of 
bankruptcy, but can be converted into common equity in case of IPO or successful 
acquisition. Also, VC investors retain the rights to gain control of the board of directors 
in case of performance falling below pre-set targets. This is often used to oust a non-
performing founder-CEO (Hellmann and Puri (2002)). Second, VC investors are 
actively present in their companies as advisors, board members, mentors, and also 
monitors of the entrepreneurs’ activity. VC spend considerable time with their 
companies, helping them reach out to potential customers or suppliers, hire talented 
employees, recruit board members, deal with regulation, and mentoring the founders 
about managing a pool of talented individuals in changing markets subject to strong 
competition (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008). Evidence also exists that VC firms 
tend to bring their companies to cooperate with established incumbents in the 
commercialization phase of their products, which greatly benefits their ability to 
generate sales, and profits, within a short period of time from their original innovation 
(Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002)). Also, VC firms push their portfolio companies to form 
strategic alliances among themselves, acting as ‘intermediaries’ that ensure that neither 
party exploits the other; such alliances are not just cosmetic, since they are associated 
with more successful performance (Lindsey (2008)). These activities and contributions 
are (potentially) very valuable to the companies. They are also very expensive, as they 
absorb valuable time from VC partners. Together with the fact that entrepreneurial 
ventures are inherently very risky, they contribute to making VC funding expensive: 
evidence shows that VC firms take about half of the shares of a start-up by the time 
funding is complete (Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)). Therefore, this type of financing is 
suitable for companies that expect to achieve ‘spectacular’ growth in a short period of 
time, and not for companies that, while profitable, expect to grow at a more normal pace.  
 
The third major challenge of VC investing is to realize satisfactory returns from the 
portfolio of firms in which a fund vehicle has invested. An important fact to be aware of 
is that VC investment outcomes are highly ‘unbalanced’: the typical fund invests in a 
dozen companies, of which more than half go bankrupt and one or two the remaining 
ones contribute the vast majority of the fund’s total returns through successful IPOs or 
acquisitions (Puri and Zarutskie (2012)). It is therefore very important to focus the VC 
energy in identifying which portfolio companies will eventually succeed. This, naturally, 
may play to the disadvantage of the others, which receive progressively less attention 
and support, and possibly see also restricted the amount of money they get over time. An 
important contractual arrangement here is the staging of investments. VCs do not 
provide companies with all the money they need to achieve success. Rather, they 
provide enough money to meet a future, well specified, target, which is typically 12 to 






hesitation. Staging has been shown to be an effective way to help VC firms manage risk 
and return, and is associated with better exit outcomes (Tian (2011)). Both IPOs and 
acquisitions are cyclical phenomena. Part of VC firms’ ability to generate returns, 
therefore, relies on their ability to correctly time the market (Gompers et al. (2008)). 
 
Taken together, these facts clearly imply that VC firms are not all the same, and that 
there is considerable diversification in terms of team composition and strategy. An 
important consequence for entrepreneurs is that they should carefully assess which type 
of funder they want, as VC is not a homogeneous form of financing. Firms that are more 
ambitious and are managed by highly experienced and talented entrepreneurs may well 
prefer to approach independent VC firms with a good track record, as found by Hsu 
(2004). A positive relationship between past track record and investment performance is 
found by Nahata (2008). 
 
3. Implications for public policy 
 
This overview of the nature and operations of VC firms, albeit very concise, points to 
some important issues that should be carefully considered by policy-makers who intend 
to create or support entrepreneurship, which are worth pointing out. First, VC 
organizations rely on experienced and talented individuals, who have accumulated 
entrepreneurial expertise over many years. Therefore any policy aiming at stimulating a 
domestic VC industry must have a medium- long-term goal. Second, independent and 
captive VC firms are very different, are suitable for different types of companies, and 
can well coexist and cooperate fruitfully. Therefore, a broad approach that allows 
different organizations to compete and cooperate is likely to be more fruitful. Third, 
direct intervention by the government as venture capitalist is possible but is not a perfect, 
not even close, substitute for private initiative. We will elaborate more on these issues 
more in sections III and IV of this paper.  
 
D. Alternative sources of entrepreneurial finance 
 
We conclude this section by considering that venture capital is a major source of 
entrepreneurial finance, but not the only one. Partly as a consequence of the success of 
many entrepreneurial companies during the dot.com bubble at the turn of the century, 
some important structural changes have taken place a global level. Most notably, the 
flow of funds from institutional investors into VC fund vehicles has decreased, as these 
investors have realized the high risks involved, and the fact that relatively few VC firms 
manage to yield consistently high returns (Phalippou (2010)). This, in turn, led many VC 
firms to move away from funding companies at seed and early stage, so that they turned 
to scaling up already successful start-ups. A space then was left open for funding very 
early stage ventures. Fortunately, this has largely emerged as successful entrepreneurs 
increasingly started investing themselves as ‘business angels.’ Angels are private 
individuals who invest their own money. Some of them do so individually, like Peter 
Thiel, co-founder of PayPal and angel to Facebook. Others work in small informal 
groups, like Cambridge Angels, or larger formal organizations called ‘Super Angels,’ 
like SV Angels, who invested in PayPal, Twitter, Square and YouTube.  
 
A major difference between angels and VC firms is that the former are individuals 
investing their own money, not that of others.  Therefore angels tend to be more patient, 
but contribute less money to any single venture, except a few very large groups like The 
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Founders’ Fund. Angels are by no means a US phenomenon, as wealthy individuals 
across the globe try to earn good returns leveraging their knowledge, experience, and 
networks (Lerner, Schoar, Sokolinski and Wilson (2015)). Another important trait of 
angel investors is their diversity, in two dimensions. First, as we have seen, they can be 
organized in very different ways. Second, some angels are able to commit little more 
than money, while others can compete with reputable VCs in terms of network, 
knowledge, entrepreneurial experience. Consequently, entrepreneurs should be quite 
discerning when accessing finance from angels. It is also important to notice that many 
entrepreneurs perceive angel funding as a stepping stone towards a venture capital round 
of financing. This is often the case, but angel financing could also become a hindrance, 
as they are sometimes willing to offer valuations and contractual terms which are so 
generous that they can discourage VC investors to provide finance at a later stage 
(Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch, and Triantis (2012), and Hellman, Schure, and Vo (2015)). 
This is not surprising, as VC investors need to generate returns for their institutional 
investors that are sufficiently high, net of their own compensation. Angels, by contrast, 
may be satisfied by lower returns because they derive a personal utility by the very fact 
of being involved with ambitious ventures. In this respect, Super Angels often behave 
more like VC funds, since their members tend to favor financial returns to the pure thrill 
of being mentors.  
 
Another source of entrepreneurial finance that has been recently developing is 
crowdfunding. This is an informal source of funding that allows entrepreneurs to address 
the public at large in order to start operations (Belleflamme, Lambert, and 
Schwienbacher (2015)). In industries like movies or consumer gadgets crowdfunding 
has been successful also as a way to obtain advanced-stage customer feedback that is 
valuable in crafting product characteristics (Larralde and Schwienbacher (2012)). 
Crowdfunding can therefore be a viable source of early stage finance for companies that 
do not require large sums of money at that stage. What is unclear is the legal viability of 
this form of ‘atomized’ funding, which still has to be tested in court (Heminway and 
Hoffman (2011)). 
 
Finally, it is useful to mention the fact that many governments provide grants for 
entrepreneurial companies. This is also a type of funding that can take many sources, 
from loan guarantees to small grants for the development of prototypes or feasibility 
studies, to subsidies to start-up incubators. It is difficult to summarize the characteristics 
of these very diverse instruments, and even more difficult to get a grasp of the overall 
amounts of money involved. I will discuss some of them in section IV. 
 
E. The contribution of venture capital to innovation and growth 
 
I conclude this section by looking at available evidence on how VC financing 
contributes to innovation and economic growth. VC is clearly associated with 
technology and innovation, as it has pioneered investing in risky industries like 
computers and biotechnologies in the 1980s, internet in the 1990s, nanotechnology and 
social media in the first decade of the 21st century. Some VC firms have even attempted 
at jump-starting whole industry segments, like happened with the eponymous Silicon 
valley firm Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield, and Byers with the Java Fund, launched in 1996 
to spur the adoption of Java software applications.  
 







Such positive view of venture capital is strongly confirmed by academic research. The 
first piece of evidence came from Hellmann and Puri (2000), who documented that 
Silicon Valley start-ups that receive VC funding tend to pursue more innovative 
strategies that start-ups that receive other forms of funding. VC-backed companies are 
also faster to bring their products to market. More recently, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) 
document that VC-backed companies are less than 1% of the total start-ups in the US, 
that they are concentrated in a few fast-growing industries, and that they account for a 
large share of young fast-growing companies, especially the really successful ones 
(‘gazelles’ and ‘unicorns’). By their nature, however, such firms are very few, which 
brings us back to the important point that VC funding is not a generic solution to 
entrepreneurs’ need for external funding. The fact that VC firms can make a difference 
in terms of picking future winners is clearly seen in their finding that the vast majority of 
VC-backed companies receives funding at a time when they still have to achieve any 
sales, let alone profit. As we have seen above, this is a risky job, and most of the 
companies end up nowhere, while the few emerging successfully are very soon ready to 
become public or be acquired by a large incumbent. Also looking at the US case, 
Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2011) document in great detail how VC firms 
change the productivity of their companies upon funding. While VCs tend to pick 
companies that are already quite productive before funding, their presence tends to 
accelerate productivity growth, Interestingly, the acceleration is more pronounced for 
early stage companies, and for companies that receive funding from more reputable VC 
firms, i.e., firms which have a more successful history of bringing their portfolio 
companies public. Both studies show that VC firms act as ‘accelerators’ of potentially 
highly productive companies. Money is an important element, but the fact that more 
successful VC firms help their portfolio companies grow more is a clear indication that 
there is more than money. To what extent the extra contribution comes from expertise 
and active support or from networking and access to additional resources is difficult to 
say, and the available studies seem to point in the direction that all elements play some 
role. This evidence is also further confirmation that only relatively few VC firms are 
able to make most of the very successful investments. This is important for policy, as we 
will see that hastily creating VC newcomers may generate expectations that will be 
shattered by the harsh reality of things.  
 
Importantly, the evidence on VC firms’ contribution to technological innovation is not 
limited to the United States. This tells us that successful technology can be developed 
using the VC model also in other economies. In Europe, for instance, VC firms also tend 
to invest in companies that have already reached some degree of technological maturity, 
as measured by patents (Engel and Keilbach (2007)). Such approach also allows for a 
comparison of the effectiveness of US and European VC firms. While this is not enough 
to draw the debate to a conclusion, Engel and Keilbach (2007) document that in the 
years around the turn of the century, European VC firms failed to spur the productivity 
of companies they financed, a result that is in stark contrast with what found by Kortum 
and Lerner (2000) and by Hsu and Ziedonis (2011) for the United States.  
 
Evidence at a more aggregate is also revealing, though it is methodologically more 
difficult to draw strong conclusion when using data that put together very different 
situations. Hirukawa, Masayuki, and Masako Ueda (2011) use advanced econometric 
techniques to argue that the amount of VC investments in a US state precedes the 
increase in average company-level productivity, and so is likely to cause it, and not to be 
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a consequence of a more productive economy that attracts more VC investments. Popov 
and Rosenboom (2009) provide similar evidence for European countries, so that we can 
consider this a general results, irrespective of nation. Overall, the wealth of studies that 
document a positive effect of VC funding on innovation is at this point quite convincing 
and uncontroversial, and brings a solid justification to policies aimed at fostering the VC 
industry as a means to achieve a more innovative economy. 
 
2. Venture capital and economic growth 
 
The next question is whether venture capital contributes to economic growth more 
generally, including a dimension that is very important for policy makers, job creation. 
Here the available studies bring some interesting facts to our attention, though the 
conclusions are less compelling than in the case of innovation, partly because the link 
with economic growth at large are more difficult to document statistically. An important 
contribution by Samila and Sorenson (2011) measures very carefully the link between 
city-level VC investment and the subsequent number of new start-ups, number of jobs 
and level of income, also at the city level. They find that VC investments have a positive 
effects on all these variables. Popov and Rosenboom (2012) find that also in Europe 
aggregate VC investments are associated with higher start-up creation. Puri and 
Zarutskie (2012) put these results in perspective. Using the whole census population of 
US companies, they document that the 0.1% of start-ups that are VC-funded account for 
about 5% of total employment over the quarter-century up to 2005. This is an impressive 
fact, especially if one considers that only about a tenth of VC-backed companies achieve 
a notable level of success.  
 
An important effect that still remains to be understood is the extent to which VC-backed 
companies contribute to modernize the economy by displacing companies and industries 
that are less productive. The recent rise of the ‘sharing economy’ with companies like 
Uber and Airbnb has mixed, and controversial, implications for policy. The net effect of 
these changes is likely to be positive, with more jobs being created than those that are 
lost in companies and industries that lose consumer appeal. However, there are delicate 
issues of social equity and redistributions that require more analysis before informed 
policy decisions can be taken for the common good.  
 
 
III. Which Factors are Necessary for a Vibrant Venture Capital 
Industry? 
 
Before turning to an examination of public policy for venture capital and of the 
financing of innovation, it is important to pause and take a careful look at what factors 
are really important for making venture capital work in the first place. On the bases of 
such knowledge one can start asking several questions about what sensible policy 
measure are.  
 
Venture capital is a form of financial intermediation (or investment for business angels). 
Like any economic activity this requires as fundamental pre-requisite an environment 
where trust is high and allow parties to engage in risky transactions (Bottazzi, Da Rin, 
and Hellmann (2016)). There are several elements that contribute to the generation of a 
stable and trustworthy environment. Fundamentally, these correspond to the institutions 






system and the rule of law, the quality of accounting standards, the quality of regulation 
and its enforcement/compliance, the quality of the workforce, and the cultural 
orientation.  
 
Entrepreneurship consists of picking and managing risky challenges. To be able to do so, 
individuals need first of all to be able to have confidence on the economic conditions of 
the country (or countries) they plan to operate in. Countries whose currency is at risk, for 
example, immediately make themselves unattractive to entrepreneurial activity, also 
when this is conducted domestically. A volatile exchange rate makes the price of 
imported goods volatile, generates fluctuations in income and in export prices. It also 
makes a country unattractive to foreign investors, both when they contribute FDI flows 
and when they contribute portfolio investments like those of VC firms. Also fiscal 
fluctuations may contribute to make the economy unstable. An important form of fiscal 
stability is that of the tax system, whose reliability, transparency, and simplicity are 
extremely important to both entrepreneurs and investors. Finally, monetary stability is 
also very important. A stable value of prices encourages economic activity and reassures 
investors that the value of their credit will not be diminished by inflation. Stable 
macroeconomic conditions are also conducive to more optimistic views of future 
growth, and therefore they encourage investment, especially for the long-term.  
 
The legal system is a fundamental pillar of any economic transaction. All economic 
agents rely on it, and the existence of a robust rule of law is a cornerstone of market 
economies. In the case of entrepreneurial companies, one main concern is about the 
reliability of contracting both with business partners and with investors. Such concerns 
are naturally mutual. Beyond the rule of law, the business friendliness of the legal 
system is also very important. Entrepreneurs have few financial resources, and when 
they have to deal with costly legal procedures, as plaintiffs or defendants, they get 
discouraged and may have to fold up their business inefficiently. Similarly, high costs of 
legal compliance are a powerful deterrent to entrepreneurs and investors alike.  
 
Accounting standards are a pillar of corporate life, and their effectiveness is a key factor 
in generating investor confidence in financial reporting. Accounting is, in a sense, the 
gatekeeper of investors’ trust, as unreliable make it difficult to understand what is going 
on in a company.  
 
The importance of regulation and its enforcement is also a major factor in the decisions 
to start a business and to invest in it. Regulations constitute a potential barrier to entry 
and a deterrence to engage in economic activity. In this sense, ineffective regulations 
may be a powerful deterrent to innovation and investment. Their role is so important that 
the World Bank ‘Doing Business’ project has become over just a few years a closely 
watched measurement benchmark, used both in academic research and policy debates.  
 
The quality of the workforce is also very important to keep a country attractive to 
investors and entrepreneurs. Productive workers are very important in any company, to 
the point that recently Mercedes Benz decided to revert back from robots to expert 
human workers for the finishing of its cars’ interiors. It realized that ‘reprogramming’ 
across different tasks expert human workers is faster and cheaper than for software-
controlled machine. Workforce quality depends on several factors, but crucial among 
them is the educational system, both academic and vocational.  
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The final pillar necessary to support a vibrant venture capital industry is culture. There 
are several cultural dimensions relevant to venture investing. One is integrity and 
reliability of business conduct, which can greatly influence the costs of protecting one’s 
interests. Another is the inherent entrepreneurial spirit of a population, and the attitude 
towards risk. Also the attitude towards social and economic inequality is important, as it 
may act as a powerful deterrent of ambitious ventures.  
 
 
IV. How Can Policy Support Venture Capital? 
 
I now proceed to examine more in detail what active policies can contribute to support, 
and in some cases even create, a venture capital industry. This is a very difficult question 
to address because of a fundamental problem: entrepreneurship and its financing have a 
long-term nature that is often difficult to reconcile with the short-term nature of the 
political process. I will keep returning to this point throughout the section. 
 
One simple and effective way to characterize policies for venture capital and innovation 
is to distinguish those that aim to increase the demand for VC funding, largely through 
the support of the creation of entrepreneurial ventures, and those that aim to increase the 
supply of VC financing, largely by making this more attractive to intermediaries and 
investors. I will therefore examine at each set of policies in turn, and the attempt to 
derive some conclusions which are supported by existing research. This will put us in a 
position to address issue relevant to Asia and the Pacific on reasonably solid grounds.  
 
A. Demand-side policies 
 
While individual initiative is at the heart of entrepreneurship, public policy has many 
ways to contribute to support the ambitious entrepreneurial initiatives. As I have argued 
in section III, an important role for the government is to create and maintain general 
economic and institutional conditions that are conducive to entrepreneurial initiative.  
While institutional stability and quality has much wider implications than for 
entrepreneurship alone, it is important to notice that it also benefits new firm creation by 
creating a healthy economic environment with strong activity by established firms, 
strong competition among them and with foreign companies, and as a consequence 
constantly growing productivity.  
 
In this section I look at three types of specific policies that may affect the development 
of entrepreneurship. I will focus on policy dimensions that may have particularly strong 
effects for the creation of new companies, rather than for the growth of existing ones.  
 
1. Fostering competition among companies 
 
The first policy dimension to consider is the degree of competition in the economy, 
especially from foreign companies. Competition has been shown to be very important 
for innovation (Aghion et al. (2005) and for economic growth (Aghion and Griffith 
(2005)). Competition is particularly important for entrepreneurial companies for two 
orders of reason. First, new companies that have ambitious goal need to find space in the 
economic environment to grow. An economy where incumbents are protected and can 
entrench themselves from new challengers is not attractive to entrepreneurs. While I am 






innovative economies also points to them being, among other things, very supportive of 
competition in product and service markets. The second reason why competition is a 
necessary condition for entrepreneurial success is that competition from abroad is 
particularly useful to force new ventures to become themselves competitive from the 
start (Bloom, Draca, and van Reenen (2016)). Indeed, economists have long abandoned 
the idea that the protection of infant industries may be a successful policy (Baldwin 
(1969)). Once again, without any goal of proving causality, innovative economies are 
mostly open to competition from abroad. As foreign competition improves productivity 
(Pavcnik (2012)), new companies that are born in economies open to imports and FDI 
are structurally more productive. Being born in a demanding environment means that 
start-up often prepare themselves from early on to become exporter themselves, but also 
to cooperate and forge alliances with foreign companies. In a globalized world, being 
born as ‘entrepreneurial jet-setter’ may prove a long-lasting advantage.  
 
2. Fostering the creation of new technology 
 
The second policy dimension relevant for creating entrepreneurship is the development 
of a solid technology base and of highly qualified human capital. As we know from 
Schumpeter (1942), technology is a major driver of creative disruption and of the 
creation of new business models that enrich individuals and make life better for society 
as a whole. Clearly, technology development is largely driven by private initiative, as it 
is by experimentation that new ways to create solutions to problems arise. There are 
several ways that public policy can contribute to technology development. First, and 
most natural, the creation of new technology is an intellectual pursuit that takes place in 
universities and labs, public or private. Therefore, the government can influence 
entrepreneurship by creating and maintaining effective universities, most of which are 
public in (almost) all countries. This may seem a simple and straightforward task, but it 
is not. In fact, interestingly, universities tend to thrive as creators of new knowledge 
exactly in the conditions where entrepreneurial start-up do: free circulation of brains and 
money, competition, a sound institutional environment (Aghion et al. (2010)). 
Interestingly, providing more funding to universities does not necessarily result in more 
scientific output, unless they are subject to keen competition from national or 
international peers. A wise design of a national university system is therefore an 
important early step towards the support of entrepreneurial ventures. In this respect, the 
US system of high competition for students and mobility of professors is one possible 
effective solution. But it is not the only one, as systems where public funding and 
oversight are prevalent may also prove effective, like in the case of the British system of 
the French system of ‘grands écoles.’ 
 
Beyond higher education, technology also arises from the money put to finance 
laboratories and research projects. Here an important feature of government policy is its 
potentially forward-looking attitude. As we know, many fundamental discoveries have 
not be the outcome of targeted research, but rather the serendipitous fruit of basic 
research which had little immediate commercial urgency or motivation. So the role of 
government for helping long-run, basic research is a potentially very fruitful policy. 
There are many ways this can be accomplished. For example, (co-)investment of long-
term industrial project that require fundamentally new technology is likely to lead to 
many commercial applications down the road, like in the case of the technologies 
developed for space activities in the race to land on the moon. Also military expenditure, 
albeit controversial, has a long-term nature that promises to yield indirect applications 
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with commercial value along the road.  
 
It is worth further remarking on the importance of a structural dimension that is very 
important for entrepreneurship: intellectual property rights. Intellectual policy often 
constitutes an important protection for new companies that shields them from predatory 
behaviour by incumbents who could easily commercialize their invention. Creating an 
efficient system of intellectual property rights also allows the creation of a market for 
technology that has been shown to be very important for allowing companies to make 
use of the technology they need (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2001)). Even in open 
source technologies, the rights to certain developments or the original technology are 
important for further commercial applications (Lerner and Tirole (2002)). 
 
3. Fostering an entrepreneurial culture 
 
The third type of policy dimension that has important effects on entrepreneurial activity 
is the creation of a culture that rewards experimentation, risk taking, and therefore 
tolerates failure. This is a very difficult topic, because it is naturally difficult for a policy-
maker to influence cultural values and attitudes. This is a very slow-moving trait of a 
population, and one cannot change it by decree. However, there are some possible 
measures that can help showing the attractiveness of entrepreneurship. For example, 
governments affect whether bankruptcy rules translate in a stigma for failed 
entrepreneurs or in sign of experience (Landier (2006)). Economies that systematically 
penalize failure discourage risk taking, and we know that risk tolerance is beneficial to 
innovation (Azoulay, Manso, and Zivin (2011), Tian and Want (2011)). 
 
B. Supply-side policies 
 
While supporting the creation of entrepreneurial ventures that create demand for funding 
may be difficult to a policy-maker because it requires policies that are long-term and 
appear difficult to communicate to the entrepreneurial community, supporting the supply 
of funds to entrepreneurs is apparently easy. However, spending public money to entice 
the supply of funds is also a treacherous route, which  
 
In this section I look at policies that may affect the supply of funds for entrepreneurial 
ventures. I will focus on three types of policy: subsidies to investors, including tax 
advantages, direct investment through different types of vehicles, and measures to spur 
the VC industry.  
 
1. Subsidies to VC investors 
 
Subsidies to investors are a very easy measure to enact, and are also palatable to policy-
makers because they can be easily communicated and have short-term effects. However, 
subsidies are costly and they may have unintended effects. In fact, there is no systematic 
study that compares the cost and benefits of subsidies to investors. A serious analysis in 
this direction would be very valuable for assessing policy. We also know relatively little 
on the effectiveness of subsidies, since they may take very different forms. On a general 
level, Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006) find that in the 1990s in Europe lower 
capital gains tax rates favor relatively more the investment in earlier stage ventures as 
well as in technological riskier sectors. Capital tax gains depress investments in early 






those type of ventures that are riskier but also have higher potential upside. By moving 
towards safer investments VC firms can therefore save the additional cost of paying a 
high tax on their capital gain. By reducing the financial gains at the moment of exiting 
the investment, capital gains also reduce entrepreneurs’ willingness to work hard to find 
successful strategies (Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004)). There is also a debate about the 
explicit guarantees that some governments provide to venture investors in case of failure 
of their portfolio companies. From an economics perspective this is a clearly very 
dangerous choice, because the risk reduction implicit in the subsidy will make VC 
investors  
 
2. Direct investment into venture capital  
 
Direct investment by the government takes the form of either establishing public VC 
firms, or of investing into private VC fund vehicles. Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli 
(2006) find that the European experience of the 1990s does not support the notion that 
more public funds directed towards venture investment is effective. On the contrary, 
they find that the large sums put at play have failed to stimulate the flow of investments 
into early stage companies.  
 
3. Fostering the development of the VC industry 
 
There are a variety of specific policy measures that can be used to create a larger and 
more effective VC industry. Some we have already examined in section III, when we 
have considered the general conditions for the development of entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial finance. Here I focus on more specific measures that target VC firms 
directly.  
 
A natural measure is to make investment into VC fund vehicles by institutional investors 
attractive. Gompers and Lerner (1998) argue that in the US the 1979 ruling that allowed 
pension funds to invest in VC fund vehicles created the conditions to greatly expand the 
supply of funds into the VC industry. This result however does not account for the 
possibility that at the same time the demand for funds also increased, leading to larger 
VC investment irrespective of the policy ruling.  
 
A different approach for the government is to create an agency that acts as public VC 
firms and invests directly into companies. This is for example the case of the US Small 
Business Innovation Research programme in the 1980s (Lerner (1999)). There are two 
aspects to these efforts. First, these agencies tend to complement private VC fund and 
often cooperate with them in providing funding to companies that are deemed valuable 
by private VC firms. Second, in the US case the development of the public VC firms 
fostered the maturation of the industry by allowing individual managers to accumulate 
investment experience that many of them then transferred to private VC firms. 
Additionally, the volume of investment made by public VCs was enough to support the 
initial development of specialized service providers like accountants, lawyers, 
investment bankers, and head hunters, that are very important for the operation of the 
VC model.  
 
As we have seen in section I, a very important element for VC firms is to generate good 
returns to their investors by existing their companies. An IPO on a public market is 
arguably the most successful exit (Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009)). It is therefore 
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important that successful ventures are able to list on a stock exchange with reasonable 
costs and with reasonable requirements. Listing a portfolio company allows VC 
investors to ‘recycle’ the financial capital they manage when it becomes less needed, and 
to put it back to work where they are most productive (Michelacci, and Suarez (2004)). 
As a secondary effect, knowing that a listing in a country is possible, also foreign 
investors will be more willing to invest, as they have more reassurance of a good path to 
exit. Assessing the European experience, Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006) find 
that opening stock exchanges targeted at innovative companies had a positive effect on 
the willingness of VC firms to invest in early stage companies.  
 
C. A balanced path towards creating a successful venture capital industry 
 
We now have enough elements to identify the main issues surrounding a viable policy 
for a successful VC industry. Let’s start with the limitations. We have argued that an 
inherent obstacle to effective policy for venture capital is the time mismatch between the 
long-term nature of most effective policies and the short-term horizon of policy-makers. 
This is important because the risk that sub-optimal short-term policies are undertaken is 
always there. The main issue to discuss at this point is that a good policy cannot be 
piece-meal but help shape and sustain what economists often dub the ‘entrepreneurial 
ecosystem.’ An ecosystem is a set of elements that mutually sustain and reinforce each 
other.  In this respect, I will now review some questions that are relevant for the VC 
industry.  
 
An ecosystem is balanced, so any government policy should avoid being too small to 
result ineffective as well as too large as to upset the incentives of private agents. For 
instance, creating a very small public VC agency, or one which has unstable funding and 
a short-term horizon, is likely to have no appreciable effect. Also being too large can do 
damage, by the crowding out of private investors. An ecosystem is also a resilient 
creature that does not need external protection to survive and prosper. Therefore an 
overly protective environment is not going to be sustainable once the supports are lifted. 
As I have remarked about the effect of competition on start-up vitality, a VC industry 
that is able to support ventures that are subject to competition from abroad, and that is 
able to withstand itself the competition of foreign investors is mature, will make 
successful investments and will reward its own institutional investors. A different type of 
resilience is the ability to attract and retain elements. Policy-makers should be aware that 
both entrepreneurs and capital are mobile, and that for them leaving is much easier and 
faster than deciding to come back again in the future. Therefore, measures that risk 
disrupting the confidence of the venture community should be considered with much 
pause. A simple measure of the difficulty to retain talented human capital is the fact that 
Silicon Valley, where talent can expect to receive reward, is full of ‘refugee’ 
entrepreneurs from many different countries. These people have left their home 
countries because these have failed in developing attractive ecosystems, where talent can 
express itself and reap its rewards.  
 
A difficulty in keeping an ecosystem vital is to balance the interests of its participants. In 
the case of entrepreneurship, the view of the economist is that there are gains from trade 
that can create a situation where all parties involved are satisfied. Reality is bit more 
complicated, since some of the parties are in fact losing out to innovators, and in certain 
cases they are difficult to compensate. The recent debates on the ‘sharing economy’ are a 






established industries and vested interests, namely licensed taxi-drivers and hotels. This 
creates tensions and clearly also pressure on policy-makers, who need to balance their 
decisions. A bright side of this debate is that it has raised public awareness that change, 
while for some painful and costly, can create enough growth and wealth for society at 
large that, hopefully, those who lose out can be compensating without them blocking a 
generally beneficial progress. 
 
It is useful to consider an example of how the ecosystem concept may be practically 
relevant for public policy. A recent study by Samila and Sorenson (2010) finds that US 
federally funded research leads to an increase in patenting rate within the same region. 
Interestingly, this effect holds true only in regions where there is an active VC industry. 
This result is apparently in contrast with that of Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli 
(2006), who find that increases in public R&D in Europe has not changed much the way 
VC funds invest. One way to reconcile the two results is to consider that the 
effectiveness of public R&D may well depend on other characteristics of the 
surrounding environment, for example the presence of an already vibrant VC industry in 
the United States and not in Europe during the 1990s. Such contextual results are very 
important because they point us to a sobering view of any analysis that focusses 
narrowly on one dimension of this complex ecosystem, thus failing to reach a deeper 
appreciation of the underlying relationships between institutional elements.  
 
I conclude this section by considering that an ecosystem needs maintenance. This means 
that, irrespective of the apparent degree of success, a very useful practice for any policy-
maker is conducting thorough assessment exercises of the policies they have put in 
place. These systematic assessment, to be planned as soon as a policy is approved, and 
conducted promptly, are a very useful tool to monitor the progress of policy 
implementation, and are also very useful to motivate a careful policy design. They 
naturally allow improvements over time, and would contribute to generate widely 
available knowledge useful for future decisions.  
 
 
V. What Role for Venture Capital in Asia and the Pacific? 
 
In this last section of the paper I bring up some considerations that may be particularly 
relevant for policy-makers in Asia and the Pacific. Clearly, a detail assessment of 
specific country situations goes beyond the scope of this paper, as it would need 
considering country-specific factors and situations. I therefore focus on some 
considerations that arise from a simple empirical exercise, and relate them to address 
general issues faced by the countries in these regions.  
 
I start by noticing that the Asian region consists of a much differentiated set of countries, 
so it is difficult to provide general advice. Asia is a young region with a rich 
entrepreneurial culture, where exchange and gains from trade are experience by large 
populations. This is in principle a fertile environment for innovation, as success story 
like Alibaba, among many, confirm. While technological innovation is concentrated in 
relatively few places, such concentration is also found in North America and Europe, 
where relatively few regions lead in terms of technology start-ups. This is a fact one has 
to reckon, as not all countries and regions, in the short term, have the qualities to thrive 
in technological innovation. In particular, some countries are economically very small, 
with limited internal markets, and with low levels of per capita income. It will be 
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difficult for such countries to develop innovation-led growth where venture capital can 
play a relevant role.  
 
The data contained in Table 1 provide some useful evidence that naturally lends itself to 
some comments. Panel A of the Table contains data for countries in Asia and the Pacific. 
Panel B of the Table contains data from some other countries in North America and 
Europe, plus Brazil. Each panel provides several data, organized by country. Countries 
are ordered by the size of their VC industry, measured by the total amount invested 
between 2006 and 2015. I look at a whole decade because of the long-term nature of this 
industry. A long-term view also allows to average out yearly variations, which are 
interesting to understand but are of somewhat little interest in the context of this paper. 
 
A first consideration comes from comparing the two Panels of the Table. By looking at 
column (viii) of each Panel, we see that Asian countries have only in few cases been able 
to build up large domestic VC industries, with the notable exceptions of China and India. 
Two countries which show a considerably small size of their VC industry, especially 
compared to their GDP are Russia and Japan. In both cases, entrepreneurship finds it 
difficult to take off. In Russia a likely explanation is the lack of institutional 
infrastructure, in Japan it is probably more a cultural factor, and the presence of an 
economy which is difficult to penetrate to outsiders. If one digs deeper, column (ix) 
reveals that only one of the smaller Asian countries has managed to develop a VC 
marketa that are relatively large compared to the country GDP. This country is 
Singapore, which has been a success case both for economic and technological 
development and for VC itself. Column (ix) also shows that China and India have large 
VC industries also relative to their GDP.  While a majority of the reference countries in 
Panel B have VC industries that above 0.5% of their GDP, all Asian countries apart from 
China, India, and Singapore, exhibit ratios that are well below this value. It is also worth 
noticing that Asian countries not reported in Panel A do not have VC activity recorded in 
the source database, ThomsonOne. Interestingly, column (x), when confronted with 
tables (viii) or (ix) points to the fact that the size of the VC industry is somewhat 
correlated with the average GDP growth rate in the last decade, but only loosely so. In 
other terms, it points to policies conducing to grow not being sufficient to stimulate a VC 
industry. As I have argued in sections III and IV, public policy for VC is complex and 
multi-faceted, and cannot be simply subsumed into good macroeconomic policy.  
 
Moving to the deal-level data on the left of each Panel, a comparison between China and 
India with the United States is sobering. Even in the two largest Indian economics and 
VC markets, the number of deals, the number of companies that are VC-backed, and the 
number of VC firms active in investing remains a fraction of those in the United States. 
Columns (iv) to (vi) provide evidence that the size of deals in Asia is not so different 
from the rest of the world. While the United States may be viewed as an ‘out-liar’ in the 
sense of remaining by far the biggest VC market in the world, it is also telling that Asia 
lacks Europe, too. This is, in a way, more interesting because Europe is clearly a closer 
target in terms of technology development and also support of entrepreneurship. 
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(number) (number) (number) (USD m) (USD m) (USD m) (USD m)
China 6,284 4,467 1,350 13 19 61 82,721
India 2,169 1,407 522 11 16 44 23,103
South Korea 1,182 904 132 3 4 30 3,972
Japan 912 715 200 4 5 18 3,680
Russia 419 326 179 8 11 19 3,487
Singapore 286 199 231 10 15 13 2,973
Malaysia 47 40 49 15 18 14 701
Taiwan 109 88 95 6 7 7 644
Vietnam 69 59 28 4 5 11 299
Ukraine 32 29 28 6 7 7 198
Indonesia 52 43 50 3 3 3 134
Turkey 58 51 46 2 3 3 129
Philippines 20 14 31 4 6 3 90
Pakistan 12 11 13 6 6 5 67
Thailand 28 25 36 2 2 1 46
Sri Lanka 4 4 4 10 10 10 41
Kazakhstan 3 3 2 12 12 18 36
Cambodia 2 2 3 10 10 6 19
Armenia 3 2 3 3 4 3 8
Georgia 3 3 3 2 2 2 5
Kyrgyzstan 1 1 1 5 5 5 5
Uzbekistan 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Total 11,697 8,395 2,304 10 15 53 122,359
Source: ThomsonOne  
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(number) (number) (number) (USD m) (USD m) (USD m) (USD m)
United States 41,018 16,807 5,017 8 20 68 338,940
United Kingdom 3,544 2,143 1,032 6 10 21 21,698
France 2,827 2,066 547 4 6 22 12,084
Germany 2,573 1,619 660 4 6 15 9,761
Sweden 1,158 753 286 5 8 22 6,198
Switzerland 453 263 261 7 12 12 3,165
Netherlands 521 364 256 6 8 12 3,024
Brazil 289 226 161 10 13 18 2,954
Finland 754 471 167 2 4 11 1,778
Total 53,137 24,712 6,272 8 16 64 399,603
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